Abstract. While Brentano's most important philosophical writings were most certainly left in manuscript upon his death, the volume that he had published in 1874 as Psychology from an empirical Standpoint remains an important work in the history of philosophy and psychology. This volume, however, was meant to be followed by a second, much more extensive one which was never published. Here the background and conception of the entire work as originally planned is examined by means of relevant source material from Brentano's manuscripts. The Aristotelian requirements that psychology should be exact and at the same time concerned with remarkable objects are seen to be guiding principles for Brentano. This is confirmed by his Würzburg lectures on psychology, which lie in the background of his projected two-volume work. It is again confirmed by his plans and his drafts for the second volume of this work. The question arises, however, why he did not manage to publish the second volume of his Psychology and indeed abandoned the project in later years. By no means did Brentano grow indifferent towards the issues to be treated therein. Nor did he become skeptical about arriving at the results which he had originally envisioned. His views concerning the method and subject matter of psychology, however, were undergoing revisions which required extensive reformulations of these results.
DEUX CONCEPTS D'INTENTIONNALITÉ DANS LA PSYCHOLOGIE DE BRENTANO GUILLAUME FRÉCHETTE
Abstract. At least since Chisholm's first papers on Brentano, it has been a common strategy to interpret Brentano's intentionality thesis (or 'Brentano's thesis') as a contribution to the theory of reference. Chisholm's interpretation of Brentano has been widely influential. Although his distinction between an ontological and a psychological thesis in Brentano's conception of intentionality, inspired by the students of Brentano, has led to a significant account of intentionality, many aspects of Brentano's original conception of intentionality are left aside in this account. In the following paper, I argue in favor of a different reading of 'Brentano's thesis', which has the advantage to take into account the intentionality of sensations (left aside in Chisholm's interpretation) and which, more generally, sheds a different light on Brentano's thesis. According to my reading, Brentano works with two different concepts of intentionality in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: the inclusion conception (being 'intentionally contained' in an act) and the directional conception of intentionality. I argue for a relative independence of these concepts on the basis of the Psychology.
THE FECHNER-BRENTANO CONTROVERSY ON THE MEASUREMENT OF SENSATION DENIS SERON
Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of Brentano's critique of Fechner's psychophysics. An attempt is made to show that, far from being a mere historical curiosity, the dispute with Fechner is of strategic importance for Brentano's theory of sensation. I defend the view that Brentano not only raised strong objections against the logarithmic law, but also sought to lay new foundations for the idea of a psychophysical measurement set forth by Fechner in his Elements of Psychophysics. In the first section, I briefly review some facts about Fechner's psychophysical law and discuss two corrections proposed by Brentano. In the second section, I examine some further, more general objections. In the final section, I then show how Brentano's late theory of "sensory spaces" could be viewed as a positive contribution to the psychophysical problem as posed by Fechner.
EMPFINDUNG, ÄUßERE WAHRNEHMUNG UND PHYSISCHES PHÄNOMEN ALS GEGENSTAND DER NATURWISSENSCHAFT IN BRENTANOS EMPIRISCHER PSYCHOLOGIE ION TĂNĂSESCU
Abstract. The paper analyses the following ideas: in Brentano's early work the problem of sensory knowledge is treated from an Aristotelian perspective and from a modern one; according to the first perspective the content of sensation is a sensible form, while according to the second the content of sensation is a physical phenomenon. In Psychology from an empirical Standpoint (1874) there are two research perspectives of the physical phenomenon: as object of the natural science and as content or immanent object of the psychical act. Psychology from 1874 is grounded on the idea that the science operates with the relative knowledge referring to the relations between the phenomena and to the laws which govern these relations. The problems of genetic psychology are treated extensively by Brentano in the first book of his Psychology, while the lectures on descriptive psychology held at the University of Vienna summarize just the results of genetic research from 1874.
LE NATURALISME DE BRENTANO JOCELYN BENOIST
Abstract. The paper examines the naturalism of Brentano's empirical psychology, a theme that is very little investigated by the exegets. The thesis of the author is that Brentano's psychology can be seen as a natural science of the mind and that the thesis of physicalists who consider that the Brentano School sustains a kind of anti-naturalism lacks fundament. The demonstration goes from the four theses of habilitation and uses the distinctions between inner perception and outer perception, psychical phenomenon and physical phenomenon. Also, the paper makes a comparative analysis of the positions of Brentano on the one hand and of Exner, and Comte on the other hand.
BRENTANO AND MATHEMATICS CARLO IERNA
Abstract. Franz Brentano is not usually associated with mathematics. Generally, only Brentano's discussion of the continuum and his critique of the mathematical accounts of it is treated in the literature. It is this detailed critique which suggests that Brentano had more than a superficial familiarity with mathematics. Indeed, considering the authors and works quoted in his lectures, Brentano appears well-informed and quite interested in the mathematical research of his time. I specifically address his lectures here as there is much less to be found about mathematics in his published works. Besides Brentano's own work, it is quite remarkable to see that practically all of his better-known students sooner or later produced a work on the philosophy of mathematics. This also encourages the supposition not just of a common interest in the matter, but of a common theoretical core. All this prompts the question: Can we speak of a Brentanist philosophy of mathematics?
BRENTANO ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES: FIRST PHILOSOPHY AND THE
MANIFOLD SENSES OF BEING DALE JACQUETTE
Abstract. Brentano investigates Aristotle's categories in his earliest published writing, and thereby sets the stage for his efforts to return philosophy from its predominant postKantianism in Brentano's day to a more scientific empiricism. The essential elements of Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's manifold senses of being are identified as conceptual reducibility and irreducibility, subsumption of one category by another, and relative height within the categorical hierarchy. A pure category logic and Aristotelian applied category logic are formalized to express Brentano's understanding of Aristotle's categorization, to test the interpretation in its logical applications, and to facilitate an inquiry into Brentano's account of Aristotle's methodology as it relates to the exact relation between first philosophy and the special sciences.
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